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ABSTRACT
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then
model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to
interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing.
In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support
but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower
base. As education raises the benefits of civic participation, it raises the support for more democratic
regimes relative to dictatorships. This increases the likelihood of democratic revolutions against






















I.  Introduction 
  The hypothesis that higher education leads to more democratic politics (Lipset 1959, 
1960) has received a good deal of empirical support (Barro 1999, Glaeser et al. 2004, 
Papaioannou and Siourounis 2005).  However, the theoretical reasons for this relationship remain 
unexplored.  In this paper, we investigate both theoretically and empirically why stable 
democracies are so rare outside of countries with high levels of education.  
  Our starting point is the connection between education and political participation.  This 
connection has been emphasized by Almond and Verba (1989, 1
st ed. 1963), who see education 
as a crucial determinant of “civic culture” and participation in democratic politics.  “The 
uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who 
has achieved a higher level of education (p. 315).” Almond and Verba’s work has influenced 
both political science (e.g., Brady et al. 1995) and sociology (e.g., Kamens 1988), and our work 
can be seen as an elaboration of their ideas using theoretical and empirical tools of economics. 
  Perhaps the most dramatic place to see the effect of education on political participation is 
student activism.  Students rioted against authority at Oxford, Bologna, and Paris even in the 
Middle Ages. Martin Luther found the most immediate intense support from the students in 
Wittenberg and other German universities.  Students played key roles in liberal movements and 
revolutions in Europe in the middle of the 19
th century. “If the revolution had a core, it was the 
young educated elite” (Randers-Pehrson, 1999, p. 145).  Both Engels and Lenin complained that 
students were unwilling to subject themselves to the leadership of the revolutionary – and not so 
democratic – elites.   More recently, student demonstrations played a role in the overthrow of 
Peron in Argentina in 1955, the downfall of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in 1958, the resistance 
to Diem in Vietnam in 1963, the resignation of the Kishi government in Japan in 1960, the anti-  3
Sukarno movement in Indonesia in 1966, the downfall of Ayub Khan in Pakistan in 1969, the 
October demonstration in Poland in 1956, the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Prague Spring 
in 1968, and the toppling of the Rhee government in Korea in 1966.  The Tiannamen student 
uprising of 1989 failed to depose the Communist Party, perhaps because the students got little 
support in generally uneducated China and were massacred by the troops.  Most recently, 
peaceful demonstrations in which students played a key part helped save democracy in Ukraine 
against the aggrandizement by the ex-President who stole the election.  
  It would be incorrect to conclude from these examples that students have a preference for 
democratic government – perhaps because they value freedom, information, or elections -- rather 
than for political participation.    The hep-hep anti-semitic riots in Bavaria in 1819 started when 
“during an academic ceremony an aged professor who had recently come out in favor of civic 
rights for Jews had to run for his life as angry students assaulted him.”   Mussolini enjoyed 
substantial support from students in the young fascist movement.    Hitler likewise relied on the 
Nazi students, who eventually seized control of the universities.   In Latin America, students 
offered strong support to the Che Guevara led communist guerilla movement, no friends of 
democracy.  The evidence that students organize to participate in collective action – democratic 
or anti-democratic -- is much more compelling than the evidence of their preference for 
democracy.   Our goal, then, is to explore more deeply the consequences of what we take to be 
the primitive connection between education and participation.   
  In Section II, we present some old and some new facts about education and democracy.  
We show that more educated democracies are more stable than the less educated ones, that 
higher education predicts transition from dictatorship to democracy but not the other way around,   4
and that the relationship between education and democracy holds within as well as across 
countries.  The evidence suggests that, consistent with Lipset, education causes democracy.  
  In Section III, we motivate the basic assumption of our model, namely that education 
leads to higher participation in a whole range of social activities, including politics.  Using 
micro-evidence from both the United States and other countries, we document the robust 
correlation between many forms of civic activity, including political participation, and education.   
  The correlation between education and civic activity is clear; the reasons for this 
correlation are less obvious.  In one view, schooling incorporates indoctrination about the virtues 
of political participation.  A second view holds that much of human capital is actually social 
capital and that schools teach students to interact with one another.  Indeed, at least two of the 
three Rs (reading and writing) are skills for interpersonal communication.  By improving 
interpersonal skills, education facilitates civic involvement.  A third hypothesis sees the more 
educated as more effective at everything, including both work and civic activities, and therefore 
as likely to spend more time on both at the expense of leisure. We review these theories and 
assess them empirically in section III. 
  Motivated by this evidence, we present a model of regime stability in Section IV.  We 
define democracies as regimes whose benefits are distributed among large numbers of citizens, 
and dictatorships as regimes whose beneficiaries are few in number.
1  Dictatorships offer sharp 
incentives to their supporters because regime insiders earn large political rents.  Democracies 
offer weaker incentives because the political rents are shared among many people.  Our core 
                                                 
1 Following the Oxford English Dictionary, we think of democracy as popular government or government by the 
people.  Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy in terms of competition for votes, and that definition is accepted by 
Huntington (1991) and Posner (2003).  Because we consider competition between democracies and dictatorships, for 
us the central difference is the distribution of political spoils in different regimes.  Most precisely, democracy in our 
model is government for the people.    5
assumption is that education raises the benefits of political participation.  As a consequence, 
relatively more people fight for the more inclusive regimes as human capital increases.     
  In this model, the political success of a democracy hinges on having a large number of 
supporters whose benefits of political participation are sufficiently high that they fight for it 
despite the low personal incentives. Education supplies such supporters and stabilizes 
democracy.  Conversely, in countries with low levels of education, dictatorship is more stable 
than democracy, because only dictatorships offer the strong incentives needed to induce people 
to defend them.  In the model in Section IV, countries with higher levels of education are more 
likely both to experience a transition from dictatorship to democracy, and to withstand anti-
democratic challenges.  Moreover, the size of the most successful challenger regime to an 
existing dictatorship rises with the level of education. 
  In addition to having some empirical support for its core assumption and delivering the 
broad empirical predictions documented in Section II, the model has several new implications.   
It predicts that, it general, education causes the more inclusive groups to dominate politics.  It 
also erodes the power of the incumbent, and can therefore lead to short run instability. In 
particular, as education increases, groups challenging to existing regimes become progressively 
larger -- small coups are replaced by large revolutions.   Although they remain to be formally 
tested, these predictions are consistent with a broad outline of European transition to democracy.       
 
II. The Empirical Relationship between Education and Democracy 
  Across the world, the correlation between education and democracy is extremely high.
2  
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the Polity IV index of democracy (Jaggers and Marshall 
                                                 
2Alvarez et al. (2000), Barro (1999), Boix and Stokes (2003), Glaeser et al. (2004), and Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2005) also consider the relationship between income and democracy.  The conclusion emerging from the   6
2003) and the years of schooling in the country in 1960 (Barro and Lee 2001).  Across 91 
countries, the correlation coefficient between these variables is 74 percent.   
  In Table 1a-1c, we consider the effect of education on the stability of both democracies 
and dictatorships.  For a country to be included in this sample, we require Barro and Lee’s data 
on schooling in the initial year, as well as Jaggers and Marshall’s (2003) continuous democracy 
classification since the initial year.  For this table, we classify all countries with Polity IV ratings 
of or below 4 as dictatorships and those with ratings above 4 as democracies.  The cutoff of four 
roughly corresponds to the sample median in 1960.  Following Glaeser et al. (2004), we classify 
countries as well-educated if they have above 5.01 years of schooling in 1960 (the 75
th percentile 
in the sample schooling distribution in 1960), moderately educated if they have below 5.01 but 
above 2.68 years of schooling (the 50
th percentile of the sample schooling distribution in 1960), 
and low-educated if the 1960 years of schooling are below 2.68 years.   
  Table 1a covers the well-educated countries.  In the first row, we count that 20 (out of 22) 
of these countries were democracies in 1960.  The only two well-educated dictatorships were 
Hungary and Poland, which were non-democratic because of foreign occupation and whose 
people rebelled against the Soviet-backed dictatorships.  Of the 20 well-educated democracies in 
1960, every one except for Uruguay (one of the least educated countries in this group) remained 
democratic over the next 40 years.  Both Poland and Hungary became democracies by 1990.   
  The second row in Table 1a takes 1970 as the starting point and looks over the next 30 
years.  22 out of 26 well educated countries were democracies in 1970, and four were 
dictatorships.  In this year, Argentina and Greece join Hungary and Poland as well educated 
dictatorships.  Of the 22 democracies, two lost this status by 2000.  All four dictatorships circa 
                                                                                                                                                             
controversies is that income does cause transition to democracy, as well as its stability.  Our focus, however, is on 
education not income.  Nor do we consider the consequences of democracy, see, e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993) and Mulligan et al. (2004).    7
1970 turned democratic by 1990.  The third row begins in 1980.  While there are 9 well-educated 
dictatorships in that year, all become democratic by 2000, and all 25 democracies stay 
democratic for the next 20 years.  Starting in 1990, we again see the permanence of democracies, 
and the tendency of dictatorships to become democratic even within a decade.  Averaging across 
the starting years 1960, 1970 and 1980, the probability of a well-educated democracy remaining 
a democracy twenty years later is 95 percent.  The probability of a well-educated dictatorship 
becoming a democracy within 20 years is 87 percent.  
  In Table 1b, we turn to countries with moderate education. Three results are noteworthy. 
First, the probability of starting out as a democracy is much lower.  Only 11 of 17 countries with 
this level of education are democracies in 1960, and only 7 out of 19 in 1970.  Second, the 
survival rate for democracies is lower.  Averaged across the starting years 1960, 1970 and 1980, 
the probability of a moderately-educated democracy remaining a democracy twenty years later is 
down to 74 percent.   Third, the likelihood that a dictatorship turns into a democracy is lower as 
well.  Averaged over 1960, 1970, and 1980, the twenty year democratization rate is down to 54 
percent from the 87 percent level for high-education countries.  
  In Table 1c, we examine countries with fewer than 2.7 years of education in the initial 
period.  Democracies in this group are rare indeed.  In 1960, there are only four poorly-educated 
democracies.  Of these, only India (which is a striking outlier) and Venezuela survive over the 
next forty years, and Venezuela’s democracy score has been falling since 1990.  In 1970, there 
are only three democracies with this little education.  Only India survives over the next thirty 
years.  In 1980, there are four democracies with less than 2.7 years of schooling.  Two of those 
survive over twenty years.  Finally, there are five democracies with less than 2.7 years of 
education in 1990, only two of which survive over ten years.  Averaged across the starting years   8
1960, 1970 and 1980, the probability of a low-educated democracy remaining one twenty years 
later is only 54 percent.  We can make similar calculations for the democratization of low- 
education dictatorships.  Averaged over the starting years 1960, 1970, and 1980, the probability 
that such a dictatorship democratizes is 26 percent.  
  In sum, high-education democracies are more persistent than low-education ones, and 
high-education dictatorships are more likely to democratize than low-education ones.  But is this 
relationship causal?  Or is causality running from democracy to education?  The evidence on 
transitions from dictatorship to democracy helps answer these questions.  Figure 2 shows the raw 
correlation between the change in the Jaggers and Marshall (2003) democracy score and years of 
schooling in 1960 (from Barro and Lee) for countries that had low democracy ratings (zero or 
one) in 1960.  This correlation is 66 percent.  If we take the entire sample of countries and 
regress the change in democracy on initial democracy and initial years of education, we estimate: 
 
(1)     1960 in    Schooling 84 .     1960 in    Democracy  98 . 13 . 4 Democracy in    Change
) 15 (. ) 09 (. ) 48 (.
• + • − =  
 
  There are 65 observations in this regression and the R-squared is 67 percent.  Initial 
schooling, even in highly dictatorial regimes, strongly predicts becoming more democratic over 
time.   In contrast, democracy does not predict growth in schooling.  We estimate: 
 
(2)     1960 in    Schooling 08 .     1960 in    Democracy  07 . 80 . 2 Schooling in    Change
) 09 (. ) 05 (. ) 28 (.
• − • + =  
 
  There are 68 observations in this regression and the R-squared is only three percent.   The 
relationship between initial democracy and changes in years of schooling is shown in Figure 3.  
While both in Table 1 and here the evidence suggests that schooling leads to democracy, there is 
no evidence that democracy leads to schooling.     9
  This evidence is subjected to more formal specifications by Glaeser et al. (2004) and 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005).   Both studies confirm that education is a strong predictor of 
transition to democracy.  The second study in particular focuses on the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991) and shows that education is a powerful predictor of 
permanent transitions from dictatorship to democracy.   
   One objection to these findings is that some permanent country characteristics, such as 
geography or culture, are responsible for producing both education and democracy.  In Table 2, 
we address this concern by estimating the relationship between education and democracy in 
regressions with country fixed effects:  
 
(3)  t i t i i t t i Schooling Democracy , , , ε β θ α + • + + = , 
 
where  t α  represents a year fixed effect,  i θ  is a country fixed effect and  t i, ε  is a country-year 
error term.  Table 2 reports several specifications so that we can compare the results for both 
different data sets and different time periods.  In all specifications, we use the Jaggers and 
Marshall (2003) democracy score.  
  The first column of Table 2 reports the results for the period 1960-2000, and uses Barro 
and Lee’s schooling variable—the same period and the same data as we used in Table 1.   With 
country and year fixed effects, the coefficient on schooling is no longer significant – indicating 
that a common cause explanation might indeed be valid.  However, the Barro and Lee measure is 
well known for its extreme persistence.  As documented in Glaeser et al. (2004), the correlation 
between Barro and Lee’s measure of years of schooling in one year and the same measure ten 
years later is never less than 97 percent.  This suggests that longer panels, new data, or both are 
needed to estimate any within-country relationship between education and democracy.   10
  Accordingly, in the rest of Table 2 we use Banks (2004) data on university and secondary 
school enrollments from 1865 to 2000.  The enrollments data are not nearly as persistent as the 
Barro and Lee measure, because conceptually they reflect investments in rather than stocks of 
human capital.  The panel is unbalanced and over the entire time period we have 133 countries.  
We have data at five year intervals giving us 25 time periods and a total of 1316 observations.  
  In the second and third columns, we keep the time period 1960-2000, but include 
separately secondary school and university enrollment measures form Banks.  Even for the short 
forty year interval, the effects of enrollments on democracy are now large and statistically 
significant in a country fixed effects specification.  That is, within countries, educational 
investment predicts democracy.  In the fourth and fifth specifications, we again use secondary 
school and university enrollment separately, but now use the whole time period from 1865 to 
2000.  The coefficients on education variables rise in magnitude and statistical significance.  The 
coefficient of 0.290 on secondary school enrollment means that a ten percent increase in such 
enrollment is associated with a 2.90 point increase in the democracy score – a huge change.  The 
coefficient of 0.850 on university enrollment implies that a one percent increase in such 
enrollment is associated with a 0.85 point increase in the democracy score.  The sixth regression 
includes both secondary school and university enrollment together.  In this specification, both 
coefficients fall, although that on university enrollment remains statistically significant.   
  The final specification does not include country fixed effects.  Both coefficients more 
than double, reflecting the fact that the correlation between education and democracy is stronger 
across countries than within countries over time.  This result is unsurprising, and could reflect an 
effect of school enrollment at a point in time on democracy in later time periods, both because 
people influence politics over their entire lives, and because educated people can create lasting   11
political institutions.  Still, despite these issues of timing, Table 2 shows a strong relationship 
between education and democracy within and not just across countries.   
  The bottom line of this section is strong support of Lipset’s (1960) hypothesis.  Education 
is highly correlated with democracy in both cross-section and panel regressions with fixed 
effects.  Moreover, the effect seems to be causal, as evidenced by the evidence on transition to 
democracy.   The question now is what theory best explains these results. 
 
III. Education and Civic Participation 
  Education may promote democracy because it raises the benefits (or reduces the costs) of 
political activity.  In section IV, we take this as an assumption and show how it explains the 
evidence.  In this section, we describe some theories of why education raises civic participation 
and then present some empirical evidence bearing on them.     
 
Why Should Education and Civic Participation Be Correlated? 
Perhaps the simplest hypothesis explaining the link between education and civic 
participation is that indoctrination about political participation is a major component of 
education.  In democracies, schools teach their students that political participation is good.  One 
“content standard” listed by the State of California’s Department of Education aspires that 
students “understand the obligations of civic-mindedness, including voting, being informed on 
civic issues, volunteering and performing public service, and serving in the military or 
alternative service.”  The original public school movement in the United States emphasized 
preparing students for participation in democracy.  This emphasis is not unique to America.  
Holmes (1979) synthesizes the aims of schools systems around the world.  Political aims are 
often cited as an educational goal: “school work is organized so as to develop democracy in   12
school and consequently in society as a whole” (Sweden), “the Constitution states that a general 
aim of education is to produce good citizens, a democratic way of living and human solidarity” 
(Costa Rica), and “an education system that creates knowledgeable, democratic and patriotic 
citizens is the aim of the Indonesian government.”  Perhaps the key implication of the 
indoctrination hypothesis is that the positive impact of schooling should be particularly 
pronounced in political rather than all social participation. 
  A second hypothesis holds that schooling lowers the costs of social interactions more 
generally.  According to this view, a primary aim of education is socialization—teaching people 
how to interact successfully with others.  Such successful interaction includes understanding and 
appreciating the others’ point of view, as well as being able to effectively communicate one’s 
own, through both writing and speech.  When people communicate successfully, they may 
control any innate anti-social tendencies, and as a consequence become more productive 
participants in group activities (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).   Formally, socialization can be 
thought of as raising the benefits of social engagement, or reducing the costs of such 
engagement, or increasing the productivity of working together in groups.   
  Education textbooks list socialization as a pillar of curriculum design.  Driscoll and Nagel 
(2005) describe several curricular approaches to primary education.  Many of these list social 
outcomes among the goals: “the children will develop cooperative relationships, reflecting both 
social skills and understanding the perspectives of others” (the Kamii and DeVries approach); 
“socialization of children. Self-regulation of behavior is necessary to participation in forms of 
society and in relationship with others” (the Bank Street approach); and “conditions that promote 
or strengthen relationship between children, and between children and adults” (the Waldorf 
approach).  Gordon and Browne (2004) write that “a major role for the early childhood teacher is   13
to see that children have enjoyable social contacts and to help motivate children toward a desire 
to be with others,” because “enhancing social intelligence builds a set of skills that may be 
among the most essential for life success of many kinds.”  
  Why do schools spend so much effort on socializing children?  An altruistic view might 
suggest that the ability to work well in social settings is among the most important skills needed 
to function in society.  A more cynical view sees socialized children as easier for their teachers to 
manage.  Whatever the reason, schools in all political and religious regimes devote considerable 
resources to teaching social cooperation
3. 
  The socialization hypothesis predicts that education should impact all forms of social 
involvement.  Its ability to predict political engagement should be no stronger than that for other 
forms of social participation.  This theory also predicts no difference in the impact of education 
on social activities in democracies or non-democracies. 
  A third hypothesis holds that schooling raises political participation because it increases 
its personal material benefits.  After all, the usual economist’s interpretation of education is that 
it increases cognitive capabilities and effectiveness.  The impact of education on competence 
should not be limited purely to the economic domain; more educated people are more likely to 
become political or civic leaders just as they are more likely to earn more money.  Higher returns 
from civic activity for the more educated might explain a positive link between education and 
civic engagement.  
  The benefits hypothesis predicts that education should be most strongly associated with 
forms of civic engagement which yield private returns.  Participation in lobbying groups or trade 
                                                 
3 By social cooperation we do not mean obedience to authority.  Obedience to authority is of course something 
different that schools also teach, although evidently not as successfully, as the evidence of student – and more 
generally educated people’s – activism against authority illustrates.     14
unions may be attractive because these groups serve the individual’s interests.  However, 
education is unlikely to raise the private returns to voting (or suicide bombing).    
  These three hypotheses all assume that education causes civic participation.  It is at least 
possible that the link between schooling and education represents selection, not treatment, and 
that exogenous characteristics that make people tolerant of education also enable them to sit 
through meetings or wait in line to vote.  If this were true, then exogenous increases in schooling 
would have no impact on overall levels of civic participation.  Furthermore, if innate 
characteristics vary more within than across areas, this view predicts a low (or non-existent) 
relationship between education and civic participation at the aggregate level. 
 
Empirical Evidence on the Education and Civic Participation 
Using the World Values Survey (WVS), we begin with cross-country evidence on 
education and membership in social groups.  We exclude countries with the Polity IV autocracy 
score above 5 from the analysis because these countries force party and other participation.  (For 
example, 25% of the Chinese respondents report membership in the Communist party).   Figure 
4 presents the results for the available 28 countries.  It shows a sharply positive and statistically 
significant (t=2.49) relationship between education and participation in social groups.  This 
evidence is broadly consistent with our theoretical perspective, but unfortunately does not allow 
us to distinguish the various hypotheses.   
  We can do that better with individual-level evidence from the United States.  There are 
two primary individual-level sources for information on social activities: the General Social 
Survey (GSS) and the DDB Needham Lifestyles Survey.  Using the GSS, DiPasquale and 
Glaeser (1999) document a strong positive relationship between education and a variety of social 
outcomes.  College graduates are 27 percent more likely than high school dropouts to say that   15
they vote in local elections and 29 percent more likely to say that they help solve local problems.  
  College graduates are also more likely to join organizations. Glaeser and Sacerdote 
(2001) show this to be true for fifteen out of sixteen forms of group membership: the exception is 
trade union membership.  Using the WVS, they also find a significant positive relationship 
between years of education and group membership in almost every country.  Education also 
positively predicts church attendance in the GSS.  Fifty percent of American college graduates 
say that they attend church more than several times per year; thirty-six percent of high school 
graduates say they attend that often.   
  Using evidence from the DDB Needham Lifestyles Survey, we revisit some of those 
results in Table 3.  The DDB Needham Survey is administered over the years 1975-1999 and 
covers (for many questions) a larger sample than the GSS.  We control for basic demographics 
such as age, race and gender.  All of our variables are categorical and take discrete values 
capturing the frequency of the activity.  We normalize each of these variables to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one.   We also control for income.  Because (as in the GSS) 
income is missing for many observations, we include these observations but code them as having 
the mean value of income in the sample, and add a dummy which takes on a value of one when 
income is missing.  We also include a dummy for each survey year to capture time trends in 
social activities.  We measure education with two separate dummy variables.  The first takes on a 
value of one if the person is a high school graduate and zero otherwise.  The second variable 
takes on a value of one if the person is a college graduate and zero otherwise.  Our results do not 
change if we use continuous measures of education.   
  In each regression, both education variables positively affect participation and both are 
almost always statistically significant.  The first regression shows the impact of education on   16
attending church.  The effect of being a college graduate relative to a high school dropout is 
more than 30 percentage points.  The second regression shows the large and positive impact of 
education on attending a class or a seminar.    
  Regression (3) shows a strong association between schooling and self-reported working 
on a community project.  In the fourth regression, we look at writing a letter to a newspaper, a 
particularly clear form of civic engagement.  Again, the correlation with education is positive, 
and the effect of college education is particularly strong.  Since the mean of this variable is much 
lower than that of many others, we should not be surprised that the coefficients on schooling are 
smaller.  Regression (5) shows results on contacting a public official.  Again, the impact of 
education is strong.   
  Regression (6) looks at registering to vote.  Obviously, this variable is an important 
measure of political participation in a democracy.  Registering to vote (and voting) is particularly 
strongly associated with years of education.  Finally, regression (7) shows that giving someone 
the finger—an anti-social form of behavior -- is negatively associated with years of schooling.  
These regressions show a pervasive pattern, in which years of schooling are associated not only 
with political participation in a democracy, but also with many other forms of social engagement. 
  Because our model addresses political battles that are often violent outside the U.S., we 
now turn to the evidence on more violent forms of group activity.  Education and training are 
closely linked to military discipline and group coherence under fire (Hanson, 2002).  Following 
Keegan (1976) and many others, Hanson argues both that historically military success is 
primarily the result of troops not fleeing under fire and that military discipline is itself the result 
of culture and education.  Costa and Kahn (2003) show that illiteracy strongly predicts desertion 
among Union soldiers in the American Civil War.     17
  Ferguson (1999) looks at the ratio of prisoners of war to total casualties across countries 
during the First World War.  This variable is described by some military historians as a measure 
of soldiers’ willingness to surrender, as opposed to fight, under fire.  Across major combatant 
countries, the ratio of prisoners to total casualties was the lowest for the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Germany (1.4%, 6.7% and 9% respectively).  These arguably were the best 
educated combatants.  The ratio of prisoners to total casualties was the highest among Russians, 
Austro-Hungarians and Italians (51.8%, 31.8% and 25.8%) – the least educated of the major 
combatants.  More standard forms of military history corroborate that these prisoner rates capture 
general failures of morale.   
  Perhaps more controversially, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2003) link 
education to terrorism in the Middle East.  They argue that terrorists see their effort as pro-social 
and supportive of their community.  Consistent with this argument, Krueger and Maleckova 
(2003) find that education predicts participation in Hezbollah activities in Lebanon.  Berrebi 
(2003) shows that more educated Palestinians are more likely to be suicide bombers.   
  Finally, two recent studies address the view that the correlation between education and 
participation is selection.  Millian, Moretti, and Oleopolos (2004) find that exogenous increases 
in education due to compulsory schooling laws raise voter turnout.   Dee (2004) finds that 
increases in education accounted for by availability of junior and community colleges have a 
large effect on subsequent participation in voting.  These results suggest that the effect of 
education on political participation is causal, rather than just the consequence of selection.  
  Can the evidence help us distinguish between the other hypotheses?  The fact that 
education predicts such social behavior as voting and fighting rather than surrendering, which do 
not earn private rewards, is inconsistent with the private benefits hypothesis.  The fact that   18
education increases all forms of participation, many of which are deeply apolitical, goes against 
the political indoctrination hypothesis.  That hypothesis is also undermined by the peaceful anti-
communist revolutions throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, dominated by 
educated people with years of pro-communist indoctrination under their belts.  Given the 
separation between church and state in the U.S. and U.K., and given the often anti-religious 
sentiment of the French educational establishment, the positive correlation between years of 
education and church attendance is hard to understand as reflecting political indoctrination.   
  The theory that best explains all of the facts is the second hypothesis: education is 
socialization.  This theory predicts the universal relationship between education and participation 
across activities and across countries.  Of course, this does not mean that other mechanisms do 
not also operate, but we are inclined to accept the view that acquiring social capital is a crucial 
part of acquiring human capital. 
 
IV. A Model of Education and Democracy 
  In this section, we model a channel through which education encourages democracy, both 
by increasing its stability and by increasing the probability of transition to democracy. The 
critical assumption, following the evidence of the previous section, is that education raises the 
benefits of political participation.  The core insight of the model is that democracy requires 
support from a broad base of citizens who face only weak incentives to fight for it, while 
dictatorships offer strong incentives to a narrow base of supporters.  Education raises the benefits 
of political participation and draws relatively more people to support democracy even when they 
face only weak incentives. 
   19
Model Setup 
We assume that the country is populated by measure 1 of homogeneous citizens, each 
with a human capital level of  0 ≥ h .
4  A regime is defined as a set G of insiders, with  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ g  
being the measure of the set, or the size of the regime.  We interpret a larger g as a more 
democratic regime.  We call a regime with g = 1 a perfect democracy. 
  In period zero, there is an exogenous status quo regime  0 G  of size 0 g .  In period one, an 
alternative regime,  1 G  of size 1 g , is proposed
5.  Membership in each regime is exogenous.  In 
period two, individuals choose whether to defend the existing regime, to fight for the new 
regime, or to stay politically uninvolved.  Individuals may not support both regimes.   Thus, in 
this model, while each individual takes as given his membership in a particular regime (or in 
neither), he still chooses whether to participate in politics.  
 We  let  0 s  denote the endogenously determined measure of people who support  0 G  and 
1 s  denote the measure of people who support 1 G  .   The challenger unseats the incumbent if and 






ρ ≡  has a continuous probability distribution Z(ρ ) on ℝ⁺.6 
                                                 
4In Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), as in our model, political participation depends on education, but education is 
determined by the initial income distribution.  
5 In our model, what matters is the relative and not the absolute size of the two regimes.  As a consequence, unlike in 
some other models of policy choice (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), raw population does not affect the 
likelihood of democracy.  Campante and Do (2005) present a model in which the raw population influences the 
availability of recruits for the anti-dictatorial coup, and hence the likelihood of democracy.  
6 In particular, if ζ is the density of  i ε  it is straightforward to compute the distribution 
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  Each decision-maker is of measure zero and so does not impact the probability that either 
regime succeeds.  Individuals therefore do not base their political participation decisions on their 
impact on the outcome.  Instead, participation is based on three different forces.  First, regimes 
provide incentives to their members to participate.  We assume that these incentives take the 
form of punishing a regime’s insiders who do not fight for it.  Second, regime insiders who 
participate themselves motivate their fellow insiders to join them. We model this as a benefit 
from participation.  We also assume that there are individual-specific costs of participation.    
  We formally model a regime’s power to motivate insiders by assuming that insiders who 
fail to support their regime suffer an expected utility loss equal to p(g).  We assume that p is a 
monotone decreasing function of g, ranging from  ( ) p p = 0  to ( ) 0 1 ≥ = p p .  Smaller groups 
impose larger punishments on free-riders.  This assumption follows Mancur Olson’s hypothesis 
that smaller groups are better at solving free-rider problems: “the greater effectiveness of 
relatively small groups […] is evident from observation and experience as well as from theory” 
(Olson 1965, p. 53).  Smaller groups benefit from mutual monitoring and punishment of 
transgressors.  As Olson (p. 61) writes, “In general, social pressure and social incentives operate 
only in groups of smaller size.”   This assumption sets up the basic tradeoff between smaller and 
larger regimes.  Small regimes provide strong incentives to a small base.  Larger regimes provide 
much weaker incentives but to a larger potential base of supporters.     
  We allow for the possibility that the incumbent regime can have an advantage in eliciting 
support, which is modeled by assuming that insiders in an incumbent regime who fail to support 
it pay an additional expected utility cost of  0 ≥ a .  This incumbent advantage may simply reflect 
access to the machinery of the state.     21
  The threat of punishment captures the global incentives provided by the leaders to all 
insiders.  We also allow regime insiders who participate to motivate their peers to do likewise.  
While the regime level motivation should be thought of as leaders threatening members, we 
think of this local motivation as friends convincing friends to come out and fight.  Precisely 
because of their local nature, these benefits are independent of the aggregate size of the regime.  
In line with Section III, we assume that they are a function of the human capital of regime 
members.  These local incentives are represented by a function b(h) that is monotonically 
increasing in h, ranging from  () b b = 0  to  ( ) b h b h = ∞ → lim .   Higher levels of human capital make 
people better at inducing their peers to politically participate.   
 The  function  b(h) captures the role of education in creating social skills, in two different 
ways.   First, more educated people are better at cajoling, encouraging, motivating, or otherwise 
persuading others they interact with to join them.  Second, more educated people are better able 
to reap the benefits of social interaction themselves, perhaps because they understand better why 
they are participating.  Socialization covers the twin powers to persuade and to understand, both   
captured by b(h).   It is more appealing to participate in a collective activity the more educated a 
person is, and the more educated the other participants are.  
  Offsetting the global and local incentives is an effort cost of political participation, which 
equals η + c , where  0 > c  is the average cost and η  a mean-zero idiosyncratic shock which is 
identically and independently distributed across all individuals.  This shock is realized at the start 
of period two, after membership in the two regimes has been defined.  We make two technical 
assumptions on the distribution of cost shocks:  (1) the distribution function F(η) is log-concave, 
and (2) η  has support [ ] η η,  such that  η η ≤ − + < − + ≤ c b p c b p .  The first assumption   22





 is monotonically decreasing in η .  Economically, this assumption means that 
the more supporters a regime already has, the more expensive it becomes for it to attract 
additional supporters.  The cost of providing incentives for turnout is convex.  This assumption is 
“commonly made in the incentives literature and is satisfied by many distributions” (Laffont and 
Tirole 1988, p. 1157).    Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) show that this assumption is satisfied by 
the uniform, normal, lognormal, exponential, Pareto, logistic, gamma, chi-square, extreme-value, 
power-function, Weibull and Laplace distributions, and by any truncation thereof.   
  The second assumption is simplifying, and implies that among individuals belonging to 
one and only one regime there are always some supporting the regime and some choosing not to 
participate, regardless of regime size and human capital.  This assumption enables us to avoid the 
uninteresting case where there is no margin of participation in a regime. 
    
Human capital and political competition 
  Consider a contest between two exogenously formed regimes  0 G  and  1 G .  Individuals 
excluded from both regimes abstain from political participation as they reap no benefits and only 
incur costs.  Members of  0 G  and not  1 G , whose mass is denoted by  0 ˆ g , have two options: 
abstaining, which has a cost  ()a g p + 0 , or participating in support of  0 G , which has a cost c+η – 
b(h).  Likewise, members of  1 G  and not  0 G , whose mass is denoted by  1 ˆ g , can abstain at a cost 
() 1 g p  or support  1 G  at a cost c+η – b(h).  Finally, some individuals could belong to both 
regimes: they can then choose to abstain at a cost  ( ) ( ) a g p g p + + 1 0 , to support  0 G   at a cost 
() ( ) h b c g p − + + η 1 , or to support  1 G  at a cost  ( ) ( ) h b c a g p − + + + η 0 .   23
  It is immediate that if 0 1 g g > , no incumbent can be induced to switch allegiance: 
conditional on participation, he always prefers to fight for the current regime both because it is 
smaller and because of the incumbency advantage.  More generally, politically active members 
of both regimes support the incumbent if and only if  ( ) ( ) 0 1 g p g p a − > . 
  We can now compute support levels for the two regimes.  If  () () 0 1 g p g p a − > , then total 
support for the incumbent is  ( ) ( ) ( ) c h b a g p F g − + + 0 0 , and that for the challenger 
() ( ) () c h b g p F g − + 1 1 ˆ .  If  0 1 g g <  and  ( ) ( ) 0 1 0 g p g p a − ≤ ≤ , then total support for the 
incumbent is  () ( ) () c h b a g p F g − + + 0 0 ˆ  and that for the challenger  ( )( ) ( ) c h b g p F g − + 1 1 . Putting 
these two pieces together, the probability that the challenger  1 G  replaces the incumbent  0 G  
equals 
(1)    
() ( ) ()
() ( ) () () ()
() ( ) ()
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Differentiation then yields: 
Proposition 1: Consider a contest between two given regimes  0 G  and  1 G : 
(a) If 0 1 g g > , or  0 1 g g <  and  ( ) ( ) 0 1 0 g p g p a − ≤ ≤ , the probability that the more inclusive 
regime succeeds is increasing in the level of human capital. 
(b) If 0 1 g g < , or  () ( ) 0 0 1 ≥ − > g p g p a , the probability that the less inclusive challenger 
succeeds is increasing in the level of human capital.  
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  The mechanism underpinning part (a) of Proposition 1 can be easily grasped graphically.  
The area of each bar in Figure 5 represents the total support for one regime at two levels of h, 
with higher support resulting from higher human capital.  The bar with the broader base captures 
the support for the democracy and the bar with the narrower base that for dictatorship.  As 
education rises, both regimes receive more support, but because the democratic regime has by 
definition a broader base, the increase in raw numbers is higher for that regime. 
  Dictatorial regimes provide strong incentives for a favored few; democratic regimes with 
many insiders provide weak incentives for their potential supporters.  The larger group has a 
wider base of supporters, but a lower participation rate.  Higher levels of human capital favor 
democratic regimes because they increase the benefits of participation for everyone, and 
encourage a larger fraction of the many beneficiaries of a democracy to support it against a more 
dictatorial alternative.  In the case presented in Figure 5, η is uniformly distributed, so that the 
increase in the participation rate is identical for both groups regardless of their size.  It is then 
immediate that the larger group derives a higher increase in its total support.  More generally, the 
assumption that F(η) is log-concave ensures that, for a given rise in h, the proportional increase 
in the participation rate is always at least as great for the smaller as for the larger group. 
      Figure 6 presents the relationship between human capital and the probability that a 
regime  0 G  is replaced by a larger, non-overlapping regime  1 G   for the case where ε is log-
normally distributed, η is uniformly distributed, and specifications of p and b are consistent with 
our assumptions.  In particular, the graph considers two challengers to a regime of size 
% 15 0 = g : the flatter curve represents a challenge by the marginally larger oligarchy  % 20 1 = g , 
while the more concave curve one by the almost democratic complement regime,  % 85 1 = g .    25
When education is low, a challenge by a rival oligarchy is much more likely to be successful.  As 
education increases, the threat coming from a democratic uprising eventually becomes dominant. 
  Part (b) of  Proposition 1 shows that with a sufficiently large incumbency advantage, 
education need no longer help the more inclusive regime, because education makes incumbency 





 is monotonically decreasing in η  means that 
increasing education always helps the group with weaker initial incentives to participate.  With 
an incumbency advantage  () ( ) 0 0 1 ≥ − > g p g p a , the larger incumbent offers stronger incentives 
even if  0 1 g g < .  In this case, therefore, an increase in education helps the challenging regime.  
When the challenger regime is larger than the incumbent, it offers weaker incentives both 
because of its size and because it lacks the incumbency advantage, and as a consequence 
education always helps it.   
    This part of the proposition suggests that education can create instability among 
competing dictatorships of roughly the same size.  When people are uneducated, even a small 
incumbency advantage ensures that the ancien regime continues to win out. As education rises 
and there are more potential participants, the probability of success for another dictatorial 
challenger increases.    
  If we focus on perfect democracy, with  1 1 = g , it is immediate that a democratic 
challenge to a dictatorial  regime always falls under part (a) of the proposition.  The probability 
that democracy succeeds in replacing oligarchy is then increasing in the level of human capital. 
  In the opposite case, an oligarchic coup by a group  1 G  such that 1 1 < g , attempts to 
overturn a perfect democracy  0 G , for which 1 0 = g .   This case is central to the stability of 
democratic regimes and is meant to shed light on subversions of initially democratic regimes by   26
coups perpetrated by either outsiders or government insiders.  It is important to note, first, that 
the coup is abortive if  ()p g p a − > 1 , for then none of the prospective oligarchs switch allegiance 
from democracy to the challenging regime.  As a consequence, democracy is perfectly stable if 
the incumbency advantage is sufficiently high, namely if  p p a − > .  If the coup has any 
probability of success, then we must once again be in the region described by part (a) of the 
proposition, and the probability that the coup succeeds in upending democracy is decreasing in 
the level of human capital.  As before, as education rises, more people are willing to support 
democracy despite the weaker incentives it offers.  
 
Endogenous Regime Size and the Stability of Regimes 
We have shown that, among two rival regimes of exogenous sizes, an increase in human 
capital makes it more likely that the more inclusive one prevails.  In particular, democracy is 
more likely to be instituted and preserved.  We next address the possible endogeneity of regime 
sizes by asking which regime size maximizes the probability of a successful revolution.  We do 
not formally model the decision-making process of regime-builders, but rather assume that the 
success-maximizing size is favored.   
  We now assume that η is uniformly distributed on [] η η , −  with 
{ } c b p b p c − + − − ≥ , max η .  We also assume that  p is three times continuously differentiable, 
and that p′′′ > 0, which makes it possible for the cost of abstention to be first a concave and then 
a convex function of group size.  Figure 7 shows an example of p used in our simulations.   
  We start by analyzing a contest between competing oligarchies.  To simplify the analysis, 
we assume that the challenger cannot recruit members of the incumbent oligarchy, or   27
analogously that it is counterproductive to do so due to a sufficiently large incumbency 
advantage  () 0 g p p a − > . 
  For a fixed incumbent regime, 0 G , the support of the non-overlapping challenger  1 G  is 








c h b g p
g g s .  Increasing the size of a group has two opposing effects 
on its support: broadening the base and decreasing the incentives for that base to participate.  The 
assumptions on p imply that the function is initially increasing in 1 g  and if  () 1 g p′  is sufficiently 
negative, the function eventually decreases.  Assuming that, for sufficiently low levels of human 
capital h≃0, the size 
*




Proposition 2:  The size 
*
1 g  of the non-overlapping challenging regime that is most likely to 
overthrow a dictatorship  0 G  is increasing in the level of human capital h, and may jump 
discretely to () 0 1 g −  when h crosses a threshold h ˆ. 
 
  As human capital increases, the greatest threat to a dictatorship becomes an ever more 
democratic regime.  For a sufficiently high level of human capital, the most successful revolution 
includes all but the members of the previous regime.  A surprising element in this proposition is 
the jump.  Figure 8 shows a possible graph of the support for a challenger to a dictatorship with 
                                                 
7 This requirement is equivalent to the formal condition that 
() ( ) [] ( ) ( ) [ ] η η + − + − − > + − + − ∈ ∃ c b g p g c b g p g g g 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ : 1 , 0 ˆ , failing which the support-
maximizing size of the challenger would be  0 1 0
*
1 ≥ ∀ − = h g g ; the latter case remains in fact mathematically 
consistent with Proposition 2, but becomes economically uninteresting.   28
% 15 0 = g ; higher curves are associated with higher levels of h.  In this case, there is indeed a 
discrete jump to the corner solution as human capital increases above h ˆ, as shown in Figure 9. 
  The intuition for the jump in the size of the support-maximizing regime comes from the 
basic economics of regime size.  For low levels of  1 g , support increases with regime size.  As 
size continues to grow, incentives rapidly decrease, which echoes the transition from a “small” to 
a “large” regime in Olson’s analysis.  In this intermediate range, support decreases with regime 
size.  As  1 g  rises even further, () 1 g p  asymptotes towards its lower bound, and incentives are so 
low already that the marginal dilution is more than offset by the addition of new members.  In 
this region, support is again increasing in regime size.   
   We now turn to the conspiracy  1 G  that is most likely to overthrow a perfect democracy. 







= .  The value of  1 g  for which  () a p g p + = 1  
describes the maximum size of a conspiracy that provides sufficient incentives to attract traitors 
from a perfect democracy.  Assuming that for sufficiently low levels of human capital h≃0 the 
size 
*
1 g  of  1 G  that maximizes its probability of success is interior, it follows that:
8   
 
Proposition 3:  The size 
*
1 g  of the challenging regime that is most likely to overthrow a perfect 
democracy is increasing in the level of human capital h, and may jump discretely to  1 g  when h 
crosses a threshold h ˆ. 
                                                 
8 This requirement is equivalent to the formal condition that 
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: , 0 ˆ , failing which the support-
maximizing size of the challenger would be  0 1
*
1 ≥ ∀ = h g g ; the latter case remains in fact mathematically 
consistent with Proposition 3, but becomes economically uninteresting.   29
  Figure 10 graphs  () 1 g t  with  % 25 1 = g ; higher curves are associated with higher levels of 
h.  Again, there is a discrete jump from an interior optimum to  1
*
1 g g = .  Figures 11 and 12 
respectively plot the maximum probability of a successful coup against democracy, and the size 
of the associated conspiracy, as a function of h.   
  This discussion suggests that the size of the success-maximizing challenger regimes 
increases with the level of education.  At low levels of education, status quo dictatorships are 
most effectively challenged by small coups, often including bands of disgruntled opponents 
(Huntington 1957, Finer 1988, Campante and Do, 2005).  At higher levels of education, the sizes 
of optimal uprisings against both dictatorship and democracy rise.  In Europe during the age of 
Revolutions, increasingly large groups fought to overthrow the existing regime.  Similarly, 
revolts against democracy, such as the Fascist takeover in Italy in the 1920s or the Nazi 
movement in Germany became increasingly broad-based in societies with more education.   
 
Implications 
The model provides one explanation for the empirical link between education and 
democracy, but also a further set of testable implications.  Proposition 1 yields two predictions.  
First, the ability of a minority to withstand or displace a large popular movement declines with 
the education of the population.  Second, the value of incumbency declines as education rises.  
Some anecdotal evidence seems consistent with these propositions.   
Before 1600, European monarchies were relatively secure against broad-based uprising.  
Sporadic peasant revolts were generally crushed, and the real threat to a monarch usually came 
from a close relative offering an alternative monarchy.  Starting with the Dutch revolution 
against Spain and the English revolution, monarchs were increasingly threatened by more   30
broadly-based opposition groups.  Notably, these two nations had unusually high levels of 
education.  In the late 18th and 19th centuries, France, Germany and Italy all experienced 
popular uprisings as well, with large roles played by the more educated citizens.  By 1920, 
monarchies had almost vanished in Europe, as the incumbency advantages of monarchs were 
wiped out in the aftermath of World War I.  But it took another 25 years in Western Europe and 
another 70 years in Eastern Europe for democracy to become entrenched. 
The implication of Proposition 1 for political instability also receives some support.   
England was unstable until 1689, with often violent royal successions (DeLong and Shleifer 
1993).  Four French regimes were toppled by popular revolts between 1789 and 1871, as the 
levels of education were growing.   Similar instability was seen in Germany and elsewhere in the 
educated Europe.  Once the transitions to democracy occurred, well educated democracies were 
themselves initially unstable.   At least at first glance, one sees similar patterns of instability of 
democracy in Latin America, former Soviet Union, and other parts of the world.  
Education also seems linked to the ability of democracies to defend themselves from 
dictatorial coups.  Popular uprisings during the less educated periods (England 1640, France 
1689, Russia 1917 and Germany in 1920) were almost invariably followed by dictatorial 
takeovers.  The educated supporters of democracy tried but failed to resist the dictators.  As 
nations became more educated, they also became more successful at defending democracy.  In 
France in the 1870s and 1880s, the Third Republic faced risks from both the monarchists and the 
popular generals, like Boulanger.  However, unlike the coups of 1797 and 1851, when the two 
Napoleons crushed their less organized opponents, in this later period a coalition of educated 
democrats protected the republic.  Such a defense of democracy was even more striking in 1990, 
when educated Russians engaged in a remarkable campaign to stop an attempted putch.   31
Propositions 2 and 3 suggests that education increases the optimal size of effective 
uprisings.  This again seems supported by European and Latin American history.  In less 
educated times and places, coups are generally small affairs including only small cadres of 
nobles or army officers (Campante and Do 2005).  As education grows, effective uprisings (like 
the American Revolution) became larger.  Eventually, large swaths of society were included in 
attempts to overthrow a regime.  Even the Nazi takeover in Germany, which eventually led to a 
dictatorship, succeeded only after the Nazis had built a broad coalition, including students and 
other educated Germans.  Their earlier attempt at a narrow coup proved an embarrassing failure.    
 
V.  Conclusion 
  The correlation between education and democracy is clear.  The reason for this 
correlation is not.  In this paper, we offer an explanation for the correlation. 
  Our explanation hinges on the connection between education and the costs and benefits 
of political engagement.  Schools socialize young people and political involvement is one form 
of socialization; a variety of evidence shows a positive connection between education and civic 
engagement.  We model education as raising the benefits of political action when individuals 
choose to support a more or less democratic regime.  In this model, democratic regimes offer 
weak incentives to a wide base of potential supporters, while dictatorships offer strong incentives 
to a narrower base.  Education increases the society-wide support for democracy because 
democracy relies on people with high participation benefits for its support.  We show that better 
educated nations are more likely both to preserve democracy and to protect it from coups.    
  The analysis raises two broader questions that are worth mentioning in conclusion.  First, 
while our model has focused on the effects of education on participation, the analysis applies to   32
all social glue that encourages collective action.   For example, the analysis might suggest that 
ethnic homogeneity is good for democracy (although in cross-country or panel regressions with 
education controls, ethnic heterogeneity does not matter for democracy).    This surely seems 
plausible, and remains to be explored.  Perhaps as interestingly, the analysis suggests a solution 
of Olson’s free-rider problem in all organizations, and not just in political regimes, namely 
human capital or other social glue as a motivation to participate.  
  Second, our analysis runs into the old puzzle, namely why do some dictators invest in 
education if they know that doing so eventually dooms them?   The examples of fallen dictators 
in East Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union are telling reminders of this risk.  
There are several possible answers.  One is that many dictators face an external threat, and 
therefore must grow their economies and their armies (including investing in human capital) to 
counter these threats even if this raises the risk of democratization.   A second is that even selfish 
dictators unconcerned with external threats might derive income from economic growth, and 
therefore promote education to get richer.  A third (and most original) idea is that all dictators 
face significant ouster risks, and that it is much better for the dictator’s life for him to be replaced 
by a democracy in an educated country than by another dictator in an uneducated one.    
  Our initial empirical results offer scant hope for the success of democracies transplanted 
in highly uneducated countries.  Among the countries for which we have data, only four with 
education levels like those of Afghanistan and Haiti have had democracies for twenty years of 
more (Botswana, India, Papua New Guinea and Venezuela).  We estimate that the probability 
that democracies imposed on these countries will turn into dictatorships within 20 years is over 
50 percent.  As Iraq is better educated, the chance of democracy surviving is higher.  Still, the 
odds are far from one.     33
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Figure 1: Education and Democracy
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Figure 2: Schooling and the Growth of Democracy 1960-2000
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Figure 3: Democracy and the Growth of Schooling 1960-2000
1960 democ





































































Figure 4: Membership and Education by Country in 1990   39
























Figure 6: Probability of success for a more democratic regime   40






Figure 7: An example of cost function with p′ < 0 and p′′′ > 0 
 
 











Figure 8: Support for a challenger to an oligarchy G : g = 0.15   41













Figure 9:  Discrete jump in g* as h crosses the threshold 
 
 



































Figure 12: Size of the most effective oligarchic coup   43
Table 1a – The Stability of Democracy and Dictatorship in High Education Countries (>5.0115) 
Initial Year and 
Total countries 
Number of 
Countries that are:  
Number of Countries  
still after 10 years: 
Number of Countries  
still after 20 years: 
Number of Countries  
still after 30 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 40 years: 
1960:   Democracy 











1970    Democracy 










1980    Democracy 








1990    Democracy 





       
 
Table 1b – The Stability of Democracy and Dictatorship in Intermediate Education Countries (2.6785-5.0115) 
Initial Year and 
Total countries 
Number of 
Countries that are: 
Number of Countries still 
after 10 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 20 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 30 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 40 years: 
1960:   Democracy 











1970    Democracy 










1980    Democracy 








1990    Democracy 





       
 
Table 1c – The Stability of Democracy and Dictatorship in Low Education Countries (< 2.6785) 
Initial Year and 
Total countries 
Number of 
Countries that are: 
Number of Countries still 
after 10 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 20 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 30 years: 
Number of Countries still 
after 40 years: 
1960:   Democracy 











1970    Democracy 










1980    Democracy 








1990    Democracy 





       
 












Table 2 - The Effect of Education on Democracy, 1865-2000 












Secondary  Coefficient  -  0.181  0.290 -  0.238    0.499 
    (0.053)  (0.046)   (0.496)  (0.136) 
University  Coefficient  -  - 0.633 - 0.850 0.532  1.825 
     (0.196)  (0.172)  (0.183)  (0.430) 
Years  of  Schooling  -0.237  - - - -  -  - 
  (0.150)          
Country  Fixed  Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Countries  101  132 132 133 133  133  133 
Years 9  9  9  25  25  25  25 
Observations 777  691  691  1316  1316  1316  1316 
R-Squared  0.799  0.879 0.879 0.788 0.786  0.790  0.210 
Dependent variable is the democracy score from: Jaggers, Keither and Monty G. Marshall (2003). “Polity IV Project.” Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Online at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm. 
Average Years of Schooling data (column 1) from: Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, International Data on Educational Attainment: 
Updates and Implications. Source: Barro and Lee (2000)  Data posted on http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 
Enrollment data (columns 2-7) from: Banks, Arthur S (2004).  Cross National Time-Series Data Archive.  CD-ROM.  Binghamton, New 
York: Arthur S. Banks. 
Data are every 5 years from 1865 to 2000 with the exception of 1915, 1940, and 1945, for which data are unavailable.   45
 
Table 3:  Social Engagement and Education 
  
Attended church or    
other place of worship 
Attended a      
class or seminar 
Worked on a 
community project 
Wrote a letter 
to the editor 
Contacted a 
public official 
Are you a 
registered voter? 
Gave someone the 
finger while driving 
Dependent variable mean  22.7 4.8  2.4  0.5  2.1  88%  2.1 
High School grad  0.1794 0.181  0.1209  0.0353  0.1044  0.4673  -0.1413 
   [12.22]** [7.01]**  [8.69]**  [1.88]  [2.15]*  [7.89]**  [3.01]** 
College grad  0.1593 0.4011  0.1997  0.0865  0.1828  0.1632  -0.159 
   [14.45]** [23.18]**  [19.10]**  [6.50]**  [4.65]**  [4.63]**  [5.84]** 
Survey year  -0.018  -0.0169  -0.0069  0.0002        0.04 
   [14.38]**  [3.27]**  [5.85]**  [0.10]        [1.69] 
Female  0.2515 0.0282  0.0733  0.005  -0.1546  0.1167  -0.2101 
   [27.66]** [1.92]  [8.51]**  [0.45]  [4.77]**  [3.77]**  [8.74]** 
Age  0.0103 -0.0111  0.0056  0.0016  0.0027  0.0119  -0.0122 
   [36.12]** [24.02]**  [20.55]**  [4.66]**  [2.50]*  [12.18]**  [16.34]** 
Black  0.0983 -0.0549  0.0095  0.0138  -0.1619  0.1167     
   [4.61]** [1.84]  [0.47]  [0.57]  [1.64]  [2.10]*     
Asian  -0.303 0.1815  -0.0641  0.0607  0.0778  -0.533     
   [5.61]** [2.74]**  [1.25]  [1.06] [0.15] [4.61]**     
Other  -0.1549 0.0918  0.0688  0.3124  -0.1327  -0.0172     
   [2.76]** [1.27]  [1.29]  [5.01]** [0.46]  [0.12]     
Log income in 2000 dollars  0.02 -0.0659  0.052  -0.0181  0.0063  0.1299  -0.0038 
   [3.08]** [6.17]**  [8.45]**  [2.29]*  [0.20]  [5.84]**  [0.22] 
Missing income data  -0.0243 -0.0149  0.0085  0.0295  -0.1134  0.0164  0.0143 
   [1.04] [0.48]  [0.39]  [1.14]  [0.83]  [0.19]  [0.27] 
Constant  34.7132 34.6147  12.7943  -0.4271  -0.2611  -2.4316  -79.0522 
   [14.01]** [3.37]**  [5.44]**  [0.09]  [0.85]  [10.15]**  [1.67] 
Observations  47459 18888  47808  30710  3229  3617  6747 
R-squared  0.05 0.07  0.02  0  0.02  0.08  0.05 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets.  * Indicated significance at 5%; ** Indicates significance at 1%.  Data from DDB Needham 